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ABSTRACT 
 
SARAH MILLER: History, Myth, and Audience in Thucydides: Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton 
(Under the direction of Emily Baragwanath) 
 
 
Thucydides’ critique of history’s reception in the proem of book 1 is meant 
to have a rhetorical effect upon his own history’s recipients: he aims his proem at 
a sophisticated and self-interested audience that wants to demonstrate its interest 
in accurate knowledge, as opposed to flattering τὸ μυθῶδες. Thucydides 
subsequently employs speeches to dramatize the Athenians’ relationship to 
historical and political knowledge, showing how confusions engendered by the 
political rhetoric of Pericles’ funeral oration climax in the principled self-
ignorance displayed in the Herms and Mysteries trials of 415. Through this 
dramatization of the problems with the Athenians’ relationship to knowledge, 
especially in his double treatment of the politically charged Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton story, Thucydides moves his readers away from the assumptions 
that he attributes to them at the start of his composition, and educates them in 
the significance of the absence of τὸ μυθῶδες from his histories. 
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Introduction 
 
 Thucydides tells the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton twice (1.20, 
6.53-6.59).1 In the proem to his composition, Thucydides challenges Athenian 
self-knowledge by criticizing the accuracy of one of Athens’ founding myths, the 
story of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton (1.20).2 At the same time, 
he invites his reader to eschew the tendentious errors of careless popular 
tradition in favor of his own carefully researched history (1.21-1.22).  In book six, 
Thucydides returns to the tyrannicides story, claiming that the story itself, as 
popularly understood, accounts for the Athenians’ frame of mind as they 
respond to the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms in 
415. The approach to history that leads the Athenians to misunderstand the 
tyrannicides story is then mirrored in their approach to testimony in the trials. In 
this way, Thucydides uses the affair of the Herms and the Mysteries to illustrate 
the issues that were under discussion in book one’s proem.3 
                                                 
1 Meyer 2008: 13-15 summarizes the scholarship on the two passages. 
2 Euben 1997: 67, Ludwig 2002: 159. 
3 Meyer 2008 analyzes how the Harmodius and Aristogeiton digression of book six exemplifies 
the approach to history that Thucydides advocates in the proem of book one, while the narrative 
2 
 Why do the Athenians misremember and misunderstand history? 
Thucydides’ methodological digression traces both inadvertent and deliberate 
sources of corruption within the historical record, but also distinguishes between 
a desire for a clear knowledge of the things that happened, and a desire for the 
embellishment and flattery typical of historical myth. In the proem, the 
distinction between these two kinds of history, and the two kinds of readers that 
correspond, appears neat. In the narrative that follows, however, this distinction 
is blurred and confused, as the Athenians appear to want to combine accurate 
history that can be subjected to analysis and interpreted in relation to real, 
present events, and myth that can be emulated and understood despite factual 
inconsistencies, falsehoods, or fabrications. Thucydides’ reader is thus led to see 
the distinctions not simply between history and myth, but between history 
treated as history, and history received as myth, myth received as myth, and 
myth treated as history. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the Herms and Mysteries trials show how badly the Athenians go wrong when they attempt to 
learn from history’s example without first ascertaining what, historically, happened, and what its 
significance really is (see especially Meyer 2008: 31-32). In Meyer, the lesson for Thucydides’ 
reader is that clarity and precision are integral to the significance of history, and that the reader 
has a responsibility to apply history’s lessons well and not poorly (Meyer 2008: 33-34). Meyer 
sees the Athenians as sharing Thucydides’ approach to history, with the exception of his 
painstaking methodology; in this view, a disregard for accuracy eventually opens the door to 
partiality, rather than partiality motivating the first instances of inaccuracy (Meyer 2008: 27-30). 
  
 
 
Chapter I. Thucydides’ Critique of Hearsay History 
 
 
Thucydides’ critique of history’s reception occurs within the 
methodological digression located within the proem to book 1. This discussion of 
methodology digresses from the Archeology, Thucydides’ brief summary of the 
early history of Greece, designed to indicate its historical unimportance relative 
to the Peloponnesian War. Herodotus had already begun his Histories with the 
Persians’ demythologized rendition of the stories of Io, Europe, Medea, and 
Helen.4 Thucydides goes farther in the same direction by deromanticizing even 
the parts of the tradition that remained historically possible. The role of 
individual human actors is minimized, and the impetus of political allegiance 
and economic advantage is emphasized, as Thucydides pares down the 
traditional accounts to meet his standards of plausibility and likelihood.5 The 
                                                 
4 Dewald 1999: 225-227. 
5 Hunter 1982: 100-107 discusses the distinctive aspects of Thucydides’ approach to early Greek 
history. Observing that Thucydides, like Herodotus, treats mythical legends as if they had a basis 
in history, and the characters who appear in myths as if they were real people, she concludes that 
“one cannot discover in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides a distinction between historical 
and mythical time” (Hunter 1982: 103). On the contrary, Thucydides’ conviction that “the past is 
similar to the present” leads him to explicate even the mythical past in light of the present, in a 
reverse of the process which he recommends to his reader in dealing with the future (Hunter 
1982: 102-103). 
4 
resulting impression of early Greek history is “unheroic.”6 The personalities of its 
actors, their individual experiences, and most of the contingencies of their 
choices and fortunes are, as far as Thucydides is concerned, lost, along with the 
precise and accurate records that Thucydides would sooner have preserved. 
Thucydides summarizes the Archeology with an acknowledgment that it 
is difficult to trust each and every bit of evidence concerning the distant past: τὰ 
μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ηὗρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἑξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι 
(1.20.1). If the things that are difficult to believe include parts of Thucydides’ 
account, the statement functions as a kind of disclaimer for the Archeology, for a 
reader who doubts its claims. On this reading, Thucydides is anticipating his 
discussion of the importance of cross-examination, by inviting his reader to share 
his discomfort with very old traditions. Thucydides introduced the Archeology 
with a similar disclaimer (1.1.3) and cited Homer only with reservations (1.9.4, 
1.10.3), so his reader is prepared for this kind of caveat. If, however, the reader’s 
reaction to the Archeology is not skepticism over what it contains, but 
disappointment at what it omits, this statement can also be taken as Thucydides’ 
explanation for excluding and downplaying the both the mythical and the 
romantic elements of the traditional stories. Again, the best examples concern the 
Trojan War: he downplays the oath to defend Helen, emphasizes that only a lack 
                                                 
6 Dewald 1999: 236-237, citing Connor 1984: 25-28.  
5 
of funds made the war long and difficult, and argues that the expedition 
represented pressure from powerful Mycenae, not a pan-Hellenic cooperative 
effort (1.9.1; 1.11.2). To the reader who already regrets the absence of these 
stories, Thucydides will excuse and defend his own approach. 
In the following sentence, Thucydides claims that men take from each 
other hearsay about things that have happened, even things regarding their own 
country, without examination: οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν 
προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἢν ἐπιχώρια σφίσιν ᾖ, ὁμοίως ἀβασανίστως παρ’ 
ἀλλήλων δέχονται (1.20.1).7 The ἢν…ὁμοίως construction expresses 
Thucydides’ opinion: men should judge the accuracy of things that have 
happened in their own country, at least. The criticism appears twofold: men 
should care enough at least about their own country to concern themselves with 
the accuracy of its history, and second, men in their own country have better 
access to the evidence against which historical accounts can be checked, and 
therefore less of an excuse. The conclusion of the passage accordingly focuses on 
the effort involved in achieving accuracy: οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ 
ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται (1.20.3). The 
prevalence of the inaccuracies that Thucydides has just corrected proves how 
                                                 
7 Greek text taken from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae at the University of California, Irving, 
through subscription provided by University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
6 
careless (ἀταλαίπωρος) is most men’s inquiry into truth. Instead, they turn to 
what is close at hand (τὰ ἑτοῖμα). The reason for the inaccuracies of the popular 
tradition seems to be a combination of apathy and sloth: hearers are easily 
contented, and avoid the labor of examining what they are hearing. 
The entire digression upon history, its reception, and Thucydides’ own 
methods and goals occurs between Thucydides’ two brief summaries of the 
Persian War (1.23).8 Just as Herodotus used a retelling of the Trojan War to 
situate his histories in relation to Homer, Thucydides uses his retelling of Greek 
history to situate his composition in relation to Homer and Herodotus. 
Thucydides explicitly introduces his account of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton 
episode as a correction of the story believed by most Athenians on the basis of 
hearsay (ἀκοή), Herodotus’ most frequently cited source.9 Whereas Herodotus 
constructs a large part of his Histories by recounting people’s stories about their 
past, Thucydides mentions the Athenian version of the Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton story only to subject it to analysis and refute its errors.10 The 
accusation of slipshod research, then, falls off Herodotus’ back, insofar as he 
never treats the stories as precisely accurate historical accounts. Dewald 1999 
                                                 
8 Hornblower 1991: 57-58. 
9 Murray 2001: 16-44. 
10 Dewald 1999: 236; Luraghi 2001: 150. 
7 
states it eloquently: “Herodotus [… emphasizes] that it is only on the level of the 
logos itself that he vouches for the reality of what he conveys—these are, he says, 
real stories, really told him by others.”11 It is not simply that Herodotus relies on 
hearsay while Thucydides does not, but that Thucydides is less interested in the 
significance of oral and popular traditions, and more interested in constructing a 
single coherent analysis of events which are recent and well-known enough for 
him to support the claim of factual precision. 
Not too surprisingly, then, Herodotus’ account of the myth of the 
tyrannicides (Hdt. 5.55, 6.121-123) agrees with Thucydides’ account as it is 
presented here. While Thucydides tells us that Athenians think Hipparchus was 
the tyrant, Herodotus, like Thucydides, identifies Hipparchus as the brother to 
the tyrant Hippias (Hdt. 5.55).12 The Athenians persisted in getting the story 
wrong despite Herodotus. In Thucydides’ second example of erroneous 
knowledge of contemporary facts, he appears to be correcting Herodotus when 
he addresses how many votes are held by the Spartan kings (Hdt. 6.57.5): not two 
apiece, but one each. Herodotus’ statement, however, is ambiguous: he says that 
the Spartan kings receive two votes – he may well mean two votes between 
                                                 
11 Dewald 1999: 246 
12 Stanton 1990: 121. 
8 
them.13 Thucydides would then be criticizing Herodotus more for ambiguity 
than ignorance. 
Thucydides’ final example targets Herodotus 9.53.2, where Herodotus 
refers to the Pitanate λόχος of the Lacedaimonian army, which Thucydides here 
insists does not exist. A modern verdict has not been reached as to which 
historian is correct; Hornblower 1990, perhaps picking up on the essential 
character of Thucydides’ critique of his predecessor, suggests that, even if 
Thucydides is correct, Herodotus “may have been speaking loosely.”14 While this 
may be more than Thucydides would be willing to grant, even by Thucydides’ 
reckoning, Herodotus is not so much poorly researched as frequently loose or 
ambiguous, and Thucydides’ criticisms fall hard upon Herodotus’ readers for 
misunderstanding what they have “heard” from a casual reception of his 
Histories. The criticism of οἱ…ἄνθρωποι (1.20.1) and τοῖς πολλοῖς (1.20.3) is 
meant to be taken broadly, and includes the recipients (δέχονται, 1.20.1) as well 
as the sharers of such traditions.15 Hearers, as well as speakers, are being 
implicated here. 
                                                 
13 Hornblower 1991: 57. 
14 Hornblower 1990: 57-58. 
15 Plant 1999: 70-71. 
9 
False stories about the past are perpetuated when audiences are careless 
and easy to please, but the question remains of how such false stories begin. 
Thucydides’ second criticism of historical recollection as it functions in Athens is 
a criticism of those who deliberately corrupt the tradition: poets adorn the past to 
make it greater, and logographers are concerned with what is pleasing upon 
being heard rather than with what is true: ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ 
τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες […] ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον 
τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον (1.21.1). Accordingly, Thucydides has not trusted 
these sources at their word, but has relied upon the plainest evidence (τῶν 
ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων, 1.21.1) instead. The ἐπὶ τὸ phrases are revealing: the 
corruptions introduced by poets and logographers stem from what they are 
trying to accomplish by recounting the past. That is, the embellishments of the 
poets produce exaggeration (ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, 1.21.1), presumably to lend 
importance to their themes,16 and the errors of the logographers stem from a 
desire to influence their audience (ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον, 1.21.1).17 Whereas at 
1.20, it was apathy and lack of effort that perpetuated inaccurate historical 
traditions, here a positive origin of corruption is identified: some purveyors of 
the historical tradition have little to gain from accuracy, and much to gain from 
                                                 
16 Thucydides earlier uses the same words in the Archeology to qualify his reliance on Homer in 
particular (ἣν εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσμῆσαι, 1.10.3). 
17 Actual competition for prizes may be what is meant here; cf. the ἀγώνισμα at 1.22.3. 
10 
impressing or pleasing audiences at accuracy’s expense. It is not only that 
hearers do not bother to check their facts and believe whatever is ready at hand; 
there is something else they want to hear more than they want to hear the facts, 
and poets and logographers are happy to provide it.18 
Perpetuators of the historical tradition like poets and logographers 
introduce some inaccuracies, but others exist at its origin in firsthand experience. 
Thucydides acknowledges two separate sources of misinformation from 
eyewitnesses: partisanship and failures of memory: οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις 
ἑκάστοις οὐ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἑκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ 
μνήμης ἔχοι (1.22.3). This acknowledgment of the limitations of memory adds 
another dimension to the critique of hearsay at 1.21. Eyewitnesses are unable to 
remember their own experiences with precision and accuracy; even memories of 
firsthand experience require evidence, let alone secondhand reports. The role of 
partisanship in shaping eyewitness accounts reflects the shaping effect of poetry 
and logography, but it also reflects the willingness of audiences to receive a 
pleasing account. The limitations of memory leave room for even eyewitnesses 
later to accept falsified accounts of their own experiences. Forgetfulness, bias, 
poetic exaggeration, and rhetorical flattery are all sources of falsity in the 
                                                 
18 The “hearing” (τῇ ἀκροάσει) echoes the “hearsay” at the beginning of the passage. See 
Woodman 1988: 7-8 on Thucydides’ use of ring composition. 
11 
historical record, and they are perpetuated by men’s carelessness with regard to 
accuracy, and men’s appetite for grandeur (in poetry), gratification (in speeches), 
and affirmation (in partisanship).19 
These criticisms of history’s tellers and hearers are meant to have a 
rhetorical effect upon Thucydides’ own audience as well. The rhetoric of 
Thucydides’ proem appeals to someone who wants to know what really 
happened, in contradistinction to the ignorant and indiscriminate crowd 
(Ἀθηναίων πλῆθος, 1.20.2; τοῖς πολλοῖς, 1.20.3) who turn to whatever is at hand 
(τὰ ἑτοῖμα, 1.20.3). Shorey 1893 observes the importance that Thucydides’ 
(especially non-Spartan) Greeks place upon being considered intelligent and 
knowledgeable in areas relevant to their own interests.20 This is most apparent in 
the persuasive speeches, where appeals to intelligence and knowledge frequently 
replace other aspects of an ethical argument,21 and where rhetorical consideration 
                                                 
19 Flory 1990 observes that an “element of praise, self-praise, or flattery is present or strongly 
implied whenever Thucydides mentions pleasure in words” (Flory 1990: 198), as opposed to the 
gratification of curiosity or mere entertainment. 
20 Shorey 1893: 75-80. Shorey quotes especially the excursus on stasis at 3.82.8: ῥᾷον δ’ οἱ πολλοὶ 
κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ 
ἀγάλλονται. Shorey wants to implicate Thucydides in a comparable disdain, as, for example, in 
his treatment of Nicias, Shorey 1893: 87). But it is possible to take a similarly skeptical stance 
towards Thucydides’ praise of the characters, “Archidamus, Themistocles, Theseus, Pericles, 
Hermocrates, and Phrynichus,” who, unlike Nicias, are described as ουκ ἀξύνετος (Shorey 
1893: 76).  
21 E.g., the first speech at 1.140-145, where, despite frequent self-person reference, Pericles appeals 
to his policy and judgment, not (or not explicitly) his person. The speeches of Cleon and Diodotus 
at 3.37-49 (discussed in Chapter 2) address directly the issues of flattery and displays of 
12 
of the audience frequently takes the form of acknowledging (or challenging) their 
existing knowledge and understanding.22 Pericles’ speeches in particular mirror 
aspects of Thucydides’ own narrative voice,23 while appealing to an audience 
that respects intellectual abstraction and desires knowledge as an aid to self-
sufficiency.24 Connor 1984 describes Thucydides’ rhetoric in similar terms: 
“Thucydides’ history is unquestionably aimed at an audience that values 
cleverness, sophistication, intellect, and self-interest.”25 
The reader who is seeking τὸ μυθῶδες may be disappointed (καὶ ἐς μὲν 
ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται, 1.22.4), but 
Thucydides can do without him. Thucydides does not, of course, really want the 
reader primarily interested in τὸ μυθῶδες to put down the scroll. The rhetorical 
effect is to challenge the reader to be or become the reader Thucydides hopes for, 
the reader who will want to see a clear account of things: ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται 
τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν (1.22.4). Thucydides, then, aims his proem 
                                                                                                                                                 
intelligence in oratory. The speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades at 6.9-19 both rely heavily upon the 
ethical argument, but with oblique logic respectively characteristic of each. 
22 The Lacedaimonians take pains to explicitly compliment the knowledge and intelligence of 
their Athenian audience at 4.17.3. Alcibiades alternates between defending his character and 
asserting his knowledge in his speech to the Lacedaimonians at 6.89-92. 
23 Dewald 1999: “Pericles is assigned the only focalized voice within the narrative that in force 
and scope resembles that of the Thucydides-narrator himself” (Dewald 1999: 243). 
24 See especially Pericles on Athenian and Spartan education (2.37.3, 2.39.1). 
25 Connor 1984: 15. Connor continues, importantly, “but it does not simply affirm and reinforce 
those values.” 
13 
at a sophisticated and self-interested audience that will want to except itself from 
his generalizations by demonstrating an interest in accurate knowledge – an 
interest readily demonstrable by reading the remainder of Thucydides’ work. 
The rhetorical effect of Thucydides’ criticisms of history’s “hearers” is to 
influence his own audience to disassociate themselves from the ignorant, the 
gullible, and the misinformed. 
At 1.21, Thucydides describes how poetry and logography detract from 
the memory of past when he speaks of the latter winning its way into myth 
(ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες 
ἐκνενικηκότα, 1.21.1). Flory 1990 provides an account of Thucydides’ use of 
ἐκνενικηκότα at 1.21.1 as a parallel to ἐκνικῆσαι at 1.3.2, where the name 
“Hellene” conquers (ἐκνικῆσαι) its contenders for the name of all the Greeks.26 
The implication is that these stories likewise “won” their way into myth by 
vanquishing alternative accounts. This interpretation explains some part of 
Thucydides’ adamancy despite the fact that he never “banishes the poets.” The 
problem arises when mythologized legend competes with accurate historical 
record. Thucydides’ division of his internal audience into the seekers of τὸ 
μυθῶδες and the seekers τὸ σαφὲς (1.22.4) underscores his consistent treatment 
of these desiderata as separate and distinct. 
                                                 
26 Flory 1990: 200.  
14 
Thucydides returns to the concept of τὸ μυθῶδες at 1.22.4, where he 
comments on the absence of τὸ μυθῶδες from his own work. The omission of 
direct divine involvement, fantastic elements, and legendary inventions from 
historical narratives is already unsurprising in a historical writer; either 
Thucydides is contending that his composition should be preferred to poetry, or 
τὸ μυθῶδες refers to something that would be unsurprising in a historian. 
Stewart Flory has argued that τὸ μυθῶδες, the sort of stories produced by poetic 
exaggeration and logography, are best understood to be “patriotic stories in 
particular and sentimental chauvinism in general.”27 This explains the relation 
between the deliberate omission of τὸ μυθῶδες (1.22.4), Thucydides’ own 
painstaking methodology (1.21-1.22), and his criticisms of those whose 
patriotism or sentimentality results in the loss of factually precise historical 
traditions. A careless reliance on hearsay allows falsehoods to be perpetuated 
even in contradiction to evidence that is being ignored. But the falsehoods 
themselves arise not only from mistakes and poor memory, but also from 
partisans, poets, and logographers, and from the audiences who desire these 
partisan, exaggerated, and flattering accounts. Understanding τὸ μυθῶδες in this 
                                                 
27 Flory 1990: 194. Flory concludes that Thucydides is concerned about the influence of pleasure-
oriented stories on their hearers: “As we might expect of a soldier educated by the sophists, the 
only kind of dangerous pleasure of which Thucydides takes account, using τέρψις, ἡδύς, and 
related language, is pleasure in the rhetoric of speeches that prove politically or militarily 
damaging” (Flory 1990: 198). 
15 
sense, the fact takes on greater significance that, as an example of a historical 
account corrupted through hearsay, Thucydides chooses the patriotic and 
sentimental story of the tyrannicides. 
  
 
 
Chapter II. Myth and Speeches in Wartime Athens 
 
 
  Thucydides’ proem recommends his composition as useful to the reader 
who wants to consider the things that really happened and are likely to recur in a 
similar fashion (1.22.4). At the same time, the proem rhetorically appeals to 
readers who are eager to appear sophisticated, intelligent, knowledgeable, and 
self-reliant, in part by implicitly demeaning readers who prefer to be flattered 
and entertained. The reader projected by the rhetoric of the proem believes that 
the first two categories are the same, and that they are together exclusive of the 
third category. That is, the projected reader believes that he is the same as the 
reader who is interested in what really happened, and that he has nothing in 
common with the rejected reader who is only interested in τὸ μυθῶδες. These 
neat divisions break down as Thucydides develops his portrayal of Athenian 
public discourse during the time of the Peloponnesian War. As politics and 
speech affect one another in turn during this politically challenging period in 
Athenian history, it becomes apparent that Thucydides recounts the Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton myth in his proem not only because it is patriotic and 
sentimental, but because it is a foundation myth for the Athenian democracy in 
particular. Through the persuasive speeches, understood in context, and the 
17 
dramatization of how the Athenians of his narrative relate to knowledge, 
Thucydides will later move his own readers away from the assumptions that he 
here attributes to them in the proem, towards a view that is more consistent with 
his description of the ideal reader at 1.22.4. 
 
Marathon and Salamis 
 Besides the Harmodius and Aristogeiton stories themselves, these 
developments in Athenian democracy and rhetoric appear chiefly in Thucydides’ 
speeches. Thucydides has already called attention to these speeches in the 
middle of the proem’s methodological digression, possibly signaling their special 
importance in addition to explaining them on a methodological level (1.22.1). 
Dewald 1999 shows that Thucydides, who elsewhere typically maintains a 
single, coherent narrative voice, locates independent voices in the speeches.28 The 
speeches thus frequently approach history from a different perspective than 
Thucydides’ own. The speeches also interrelate to one another, and often to the 
proem of book 1 as well.29 Thucydides allows these alternative perspectives to 
                                                 
28 Dewald 1999: 240-246. 
29 In Macleod’s analysis (Macleod 1983: 385-386), of Thucydides’ speeches as having a rhetorical, 
a dramatic, and a historical aspect, this would be the historical. Stahl, in the 2003 English 
translation of his 1966 book, speaks of “speech complexes” (Stahl 2003: 122). Morrison 2006: 14-15 
describes the experience of reading the speeches in relation to one another. 
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compete with one another by letting the speeches, as if inadvertently on the part 
of the speaker, echo and distort one another throughout his work. 
The first speech that Thucydides gives to the Athenians contains the prime 
example of recent history that had nevertheless won its way into τὸ μυθῶδες: 
the battles of Marathon and Salamis. Already in Herodotus, appeals to the battle 
of Marathon supercede previous historical events in Athens’ international 
relations (Hdt. 9.27.5). In the Athenian speech provided by Thucydides, the 
Athenians filter the historical battles through a partisan lens, revealing a 
perspective on history quite different from Thucydides’. At 1.73, an Athenian 
embassy to Lacedaimon overhears the Corinthians pressuring Lacedaimon to 
invade Attica. The Athenians want to indicate the power of Athens, to remind 
(ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι) the elders of things they know, and inform the 
younger men of things they do not know. Their goal is to make the 
Lacedaimonians think twice about invading Attica, and to move them in the 
direction of peace (1.73.1). The things known to the elders and not experienced 
by the young men turn out to be the battles of the Persian Wars (1.73.4). The 
Athenians denigrate hearsay and ill-preserved history of the distant past in favor 
of the memory of eyewitnesses, much as Thucydides does at 1.21. But where 
Thucydides is interested in the testimony of eyewitnesses as one approach to τὸ 
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σαφές, the Athenians use the appeal rhetorically, to insinuate that the legends 
should not even need to be repeated (1.73.2): 
Καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων 
μάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις τῶν ἀκουσομένων; τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ καὶ ὅσα αὐτοὶ 
ξύνιστε, 
εἰ καὶ δι' ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις, ἀνάγκη λέγειν· 
 
It is, in fact, necessary to speak to an audience of events it itself experienced, if 
you are rewriting those events as national legend. 
The tendentiousness of the Athenian account is not subtle (1.73.4): φαμὲν 
γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ. The claim that the 
Athenians alone fought at Marathon is false,30 but flattering: it contributes to the 
Athenians’ view of their threefold importance: they had the largest number of 
ships, the most intelligent general, and the most unwavering zeal (1.74.1). Orwin 
1988 contrasts the Athenians’ intention as Thucydides states it (to make a 
demonstration of Athenian power) with the Athenians’ intention as they 
announce it in their speech (to justify Athenian empire). The justification itself, 
Orwin suggests, can be read as a display of boldness and power. The falsehood 
itself is a show of strength, and is understood as such. This is rhetoric reshaping 
events, not recounting them. Similarly, the excuse that the Athenians give 
themselves at 1.73.2 (εἰ καὶ δι' ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις), 
                                                 
30 Hornblower 1990: 118 cites K. R. Walters, ‘‘We Fought Alone at Marathon’: Historical 
Falsification in the Attic Funeral Speech’. Rh. Mus. 124: 204ff. 
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which seems to acknowledge that appeals to Marathon and Salamis are 
beginning to wear thin, can be interpreted as a statement of confidence that 
wherever the rhetoric is weak, force makes up for the difference. 
The double purpose of demonstrating Athenian power and justifying 
Athenian empire can be located within the mythologized versions of the stories 
of Marathon and Salamis as well, insofar as they function as foundation 
narratives for Athenian imperial identity. Exaggerating Athens’ victory 
contributes to Athenian confidence against foreign enemies. The story of Athens 
saving Greece from the Persians justifies the Athenian empire by the argument 
that the Athenian empire, in acting for its own good, benefits all Greece. In this 
way, the Athenian victories in the Persian Wars serve as foundation myths for 
Athenian imperialism, exemplifying both its character and role.3132 
  
Harmodius and Aristogeiton 
Just as the popular versions of the battles of Marathon and Salamis served 
as foundation myth for the Athenian empire, a version of the Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton story served as a foundation myth for democratic Athens. In the 
                                                 
31 De Romilly 1979: 244-248 contrasts the appeals to history, traditional rhetoric, and relatively 
modest claims of this Athenian assembly with Euphemus’ defense of Athenian imperialism at 
6.1.82-6.1.86. 
32 Orwin 1988: 74. 
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simplest and most mythologized version of the story, Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton, motivated by offense at a personal insult,33 killed the reigning 
tyrant Hipparchus and thereby restored the democracy.34 The general impression 
that Harmodius and Aristogeiton restored democracy by ending tyranny is 
supported by popular, oral tradition, lending a more technical connotation to the 
ἀκοή of Thucydides’ proem.  
Among our most noteworthy sources are four verse scolia.35 Three of the 
songs state that Harmodius and Aristogeiton slew the tyrant, identify the tyrant 
as Hipparchus, and credit the tyrant slayers with making Athens isonomous 
(ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθήνας ἐποιησάτην).36 The fourth consigns the heroes to the 
Blessed Isles. In the Lysistrata, the men suspect that the women are being used in 
a plot to reinstate tyranny in Athens, and respond with bravado explicitly 
imitative of the tyrannicides, including the singing of a similar song (Lysistrata 
                                                 
33 Thucydides himself is our first written source for Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s motivation. 
The motivation for the murder seems overdetermined in Thucydides’ account (Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton are insulted when Hipparchus twice propositions Harmodius, and then Harmodius 
is again offended when his sister is dishonored by exclusion from a festival); this suggests that he 
is drawing from preexisting traditions. 
34 Anderson 2003: 204-206 prefers restored to founded: “[a]ccording to the prevailing logic, because 
the tyrants had only to be removed for the normal course of Athenian constitutional history to be 
resumed, Harmodius and Aristogeiton were themselves directly responsible for the recent 
political change” (Anderson 2003: 205-206). 
35 Taylor 1981 cites D. L. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci 1962: 474-475, nos. 893-896, Oxford), discussed 
in Taylor 1981: 22 and Raaflaub 2003: 65. 
36 Translation Taylor 1981: 22. 
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618-635).37 Monoson 2000 discusses references to the tyrannicides in Aeschines’ 
Against Timarchus and Plato’s Symposium, both of which reflect popular emphasis 
on the idea that Harmodius and Aristogeiton saved Athens and ended the 
tyrant’s reign, while focusing on the erotic relationship between the two heroes.38 
In Thucydides’ day, the tyrannicides were officially commemorated by a 
hero cult and by a statue group positioned prominently within the agora.39 
Descendents of their families were honored by sitesis (the decree granting this 
right may have been passed by Pericles).40 The popular tradition is well 
summarized by an epigram believed to have been inscribed upon base of the 
statue group: 
ἦ μέγ' Ἀθηναίοισι φόως γένεθ', ἡνικ' Ἀριστο- 
γείτων Ἵππαρχον κτεῖνε καὶ Ἁρμόδιος. 41 
 
                                                 
37 Later, Lysistrata, ignoring the popular tyrannicide myth, reminds the Athenians of the 
historical fact that the Lacedaimonians deposed Athens’ tyrants, in order to reconcile the 
Athenians with the Spartans, on the basis of this past favor (Lysisistra 1149-1161). Aristophanes is 
apparently making a joke that hinges on the two versions of the tyrannicide story: the elite, 
civilized, accurate historical account that serves diplomacy (however twisted Lysistrata’s 
interpretation of the account may be), and the vulgar myth that serves as a nominally violent 
rallying cry for drunk troublemakers. 
38 Monoson 2000: 37-38. 
39 Taylor 1981, passim. Monoson 2000: 24-27, 32-33 summarizes the sources. 
40 Loraux 2006: 57. 
41 A fragment of the statue base of the Kritios and Nesiotes group erected in the Athenian agora 
matches this epigram attributed to Simonides (B. D. Meritt 1936: Hesperia 5, 358, discussed in 
Taylor 1981: 32). 
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Hipparchus’ death at the hands of the tyrant slayers is described as a new dawn 
for the Athenians. What did this dawning light reveal? Monoson 2000, Wohl 
2002, and Ludwig 2002 have recently examined the function of this story as a 
foundation myth. First and foremost, by falsely identifying the Hipparchus as the 
tyrant, this story exaggerated the effectiveness of Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s 
deed and imagined that the power to defend democracy lay in the hands of 
individual Athenian citizens.42 At the same time, it provided an abstract enemy 
(“tyrants”) against which Athens could continue to define itself.43 While 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s motivations were private, their action served the 
public good; thus, “the story […] placed before the Athenians a model of 
benefaction that resolved the potential for conflict between a citizen’s public and 
private loyalties.”44 
Monoson 1994 makes the argument that the recognition of the private, 
erotic motivation of Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s action is not absent from the 
popular account. She describes the democratic ideology associated with 
                                                 
42 McGlew 1993: 155-156. 
43 Monoson 2000: 29, Wohl 2002: 224. Additionally, the heroes themselves lacked political 
ambition and could never be suspected of tyrannical inclinations of their own (Monoson 2000: 
29).  
44 Monoson 2000: 37. Monoson cites as evidence Aeschines’ defense of pederasty (Against 
Timarchus 132), and Pausanias’ defense of pederasty in Plato’s Symposium (182c). Both texts 
postdate Thucydides, but Stewart 1997: 73 describes the homoerotic content already present in 
the statuary (Wohl 2002: 5, Monoson 2000: 38). 
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pederastic eros: the lover is “active, manly, self-controlled and vigorous,”45 the 
eromenos is “active, demanding, and self-controlled,” and their relationship is 
described by “mutuality and reciprocity between nonequals.”46 The tyrant’s eros, 
by contrast, is imagined to be transgressive and insatiable.47 In terms of dramatic 
roles, the tyrant is the figure who comes between the citizen and what he wants, 
and the tyrannicide is the man who defends his desire in the best interests of the 
state.48 Monoson’s association of pederasty and democratic ideals is based 
primarily on the speeches given to Pericles by Thucydides. Pericles’ political 
rhetoric is remarkable in combining both aristocratic and democratic strains. 
Insofar as the Harmodius and Aristogeiton myth combines a formalized 
aristocratic tradition of controlled pederasty with democratic ideology, it does 
the same. 
 
Pericles 
In the proem to book 1, Thucydides criticizes the flattering, pleasure-
oriented and partisan historical accounts prevalent among the careless and 
                                                 
45 Monoson 1994: 260. Monoson is discussing Pericles’ metaphor of the citizenry as erastes, and the 
city as eromenos, but her general observations apply (Monoson 1994: 257, 260-261). 
46 Monoson 1994: 263. 
47 Wohl 2002: 153-154; 226-267. 
48 Wohl 2002: 9; Ludwig 2002: 161. 
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ignorant, such as the democratic foundation myth of Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton. At the same time, he describes his own composition in terms 
designed to appeal to an audience that considers itself intellectual and self-
interested. Pericles’ funeral oration is addressed to this same self-interested, 
intellectually engaged, skeptical, and knowledge-hungry audience. Pericles’ 
language in describing Athens’ greatness recalls Thucydides’ methodological 
discussion in book 1, and he seems to be expressing the same sentiments. Athens’ 
reputation is supported by the facts themselves, just as the facts themselves 
indicate that the Peloponnesian War is greatest (1.21.2). Pericles criticizes poets 
for the same defects that Thucydides criticizes in them, and he appeals instead to 
evidence: in place of poetry, Athens has great signs (μεγάλων δὲ σημείων) and 
“not unwitnessed” power, and has everywhere left eternal monuments 
(μνημεῖα… ἀίδια), whether of good or of bad (2.41.4). According to the proem, 
consulting local monuments to confirm or critique hearsay history is just what 
Thucydides would have Athenians do.  
While Pericles predicates self-interest, intellectualism, and skepticism of 
his audience, he further identifies these qualities as specifically Athenian and 
originating in the democratic Athenian constitution and the opportunities 
afforded by empire (2.37-40, 2.42.1). Csapo and Miller 1998 distinguish an 
aristocratic view of time, which focuses on foundation myths, ancestors, and 
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heroes of the past, from a democratic view of time, which is linear, rational, and 
future oriented.49 Pericles’ oration represents an extreme of democratic 
imagination: he scarcely addresses the past (e.g., he passes over the Athenian 
ancestors in a few lines, 2.36), is most interested in relatively timeless rational 
abstractions (e.g., his stated topic at 2.36.4), and moves quickly and readily from 
the concrete present to the future (e.g., his eulogy of the deceased at 2.42-2.43). 
The funeral oration establishes the connection between the projected audience of 
Thucydides’ proem and the narrative strand concerning political discourse that 
runs through his composition. The Athenian embassy defended the Athenian 
empire on the basis of universal human character (1.75.5; 1.76.2-3); Pericles 
defends the empire on the basis of this unique Athenian character, which entitles 
them to an empire that others do not deserve. As Pericles would have it, the 
projected reader of Thucydides’ proem is a democratic Athenian. 
 
Mytilenian debate 
Pericles' funeral oration creates an idealized Athenian who is self-
interested, intellectual, and sophisticated, just like the projected reader of 
Thucydides’ proem. Cleon's speech in the Mytilenian debate criticizes the post-
Periclean democratic audience in terms that recall the proem’s criticisms of 
                                                 
49 Csapo and Miller 1998: 90-104. 
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history’s corrupters. Whereas the proem opposes the self-interested, intellectual 
reader who will find Thucydides' work useful to the pleasure-oriented, ignorant, 
and careless reader who will find it dull, Cleon's speech makes the argument that 
self-interest and a desire to be intellectual can also produce a pleasure-oriented, 
ignorant, and careless audience. Cleon and Diodotus’ debate thus complicates 
the proem’s opposition between the careless, short-sighted, and pleasure-
oriented, and the examined, time-tested, and useful, while more explicitly 
associating characteristics of the Athenians’ relationship to knowledge with their 
democratic experience and identity. At the same time, Thucydides raises the 
standards for his reader, by clarifying the potential problems with these 
Periclean tendencies when it comes to the reception of logoi.  
Thucydides’ proem associates a pleasure-seeking approach to history with 
the exaggeration of poets and the flattery of logographers. Cleon takes a different 
view: on his account, it is the Athenians’ desire to seem intellectual and self-
interested that orients them toward pleasure at the expense of truth. Cleon 
berates the Athenians for possessing similar qualities as the audience to which 
Thucydides’ own rhetoric appeals: a desire to be better informed and cleverer in 
areas of interest than those who buy into common knowledge. At 3.37.4-3.37.5, 
Cleon berates those Athenians characterized by cleverness and not knowing their 
place (δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, 3.37.3) for competing with the law and with 
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public speakers, treating the public form as a place to show off their thought 
(δηλώσαντες τὴν γνώμην, 3.37.4). He summarizes the criticism with his 
admonition that the Athenians should not be excited by their own shrewdness 
and by a contest of wit (μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους, 
3.37.5). His argument is that the slow-witted man, the weaker contestant, is 
actually more valuable to the state (3.37.4). Cleon picks up the same theme again 
at 3.38.3-3.38.7, where he goes so far as to state plainly that the objectionable 
Athenians are despisers of familiar, customary things (ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν 
εἰωθότων, 3.38.5), while reiterating his criticism of their competitive stance 
toward speeches (3.38.6-3.38.7). 
At the same time, Cleon’s criticism of the Athenians echoes certain 
elements of Thucydides’ proem. According to Cleon, the Athenians relate to 
speeches like spectators, and relate to deeds like an audience, putting more trust 
in an appealing speech than in their own first hand experience, and simply 
failing to test speeches against real things, in favor of testing them against other 
speeches (3.38.4). Similarly, in the proem to book one, the Athenians accept 
historical accounts casually on the basis of hearsay, without examination (as 
opposed to Thucydides’ own commitment to eyewitness accounts and tests of 
veracity, 1.22.2). The Athenians’ susceptibility to fine and “spectacular” speeches 
likewise recalls Thucydides’ criticism of history that has been altered to suit the 
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rhetorical purposes of the logographer and the poet. However compromised 
Cleon is as a speaker by the deceptive qualities of his own rhetoric, Cleon’s 
speech first extends the possibility that the projected reader of the proem to book 
one is not the same as the ideal reader of 1.22.4, and even that he may not be 
better off than the reader who preferred stories (except insofar as he is still 
reading Thucydides). His criticisms also put Pericles’ speeches in a different 
light. If the Athenians love to be treated as intellectual and self-interested, insofar 
as Pericles predicates these qualities of the Athenians, the charge of flattery can 
be leveled against him. 
In response to Cleon’s speech, Diodotus defends speeches and debate in 
general, and arguments based on self-interest in particular. He reserves his 
criticism for those who suspect public speakers of having ulterior motives. Cleon 
has preemptively accused any opposing speaker of sophistry and probable bribe-
taking. Diodotus attacks this suggestion as fear-mongering, and insists that the 
best argument should win, without negative repercussions for either the 
successful or the unsuccessful orator. This assertion, however, turns out to be 
ideal rather than prescriptive, as Diodotus then admits that the Athenians do the 
opposite (ὧν ἡμεῖς τἀναντία δρῶμεν, 3.43.1). His stated conclusion is not that 
the Athenians should change (though his rhetorical goal is certainly to counter 
any suspicion engendered by Cleon’s accusation), but that any orator addressing 
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Athenians is compelled to lie even in promotion of beneficial and sincere advice, 
if he wishes to be trusted and believed (3.43.2-3.43.3). Diodotus disagrees with 
Cleon that the Athenians go astray by posturing as intellectual and self-
interested. Instead, as he would have it, competitive jealousy and suspicion drive 
the Athenians to reject better advice in favor of worse. This criticism of the 
Athenians looks backward to 2.37, where Pericles denied that the Athenians 
were suspicious, and forward to the trials of the desecration of the Mysteries and 
the mutilation of the Herms. 
A further complication, however, arises when Diodotus’ assertion of the 
necessity of falsehood is applied back to his own speech. While the focalization is 
ambiguous, the surrounding narrative invites the reader to think of the execution 
of the Mytilenians as both cruel and unjust. Diodotus’ speech (and, as far as the 
Peloponnesian War is concerned, Diodotus himself) serves only one purpose in the 
narrative of events: it persuades a majority of Athenians to vote against the 
previous decree. If Diodotus’ true motivation to spare the Mytilenians was the 
same as the motivation of the men who convened the assembly, then his appeals 
to self-interest constitute the lie and the disguise, and he may not disagree as 
strongly with Cleon’s depiction of the Athenian audience as he makes it seem.50 
                                                 
50 The argument for this reading of Diodotus is given at Orwin 1985: 146-154 and restated more 
strongly at Monoson and Loraux 1998: 292. 
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The Athenians, then, come off as badly as possible as an audience of this debate, 
and the effectiveness of each speaker’s rhetoric is reflected in the vote, which is 
nearly split. There is no other indication of how the Athenians received the claim 
that lies are necessary to speak to them; we are left with Diodotus’ grim view of 
the complete breakdown of the free and open honesty that Pericles had insisted 
characterized Athenian public life. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter III. Hearsay History vs. Thucydides’ Corrected Account 
 
The simplest and most mythologized version of the tyrannicide story, in 
which Harmodius and Aristogeiton save Athenian democracy, is never explicitly 
acknowledged by Thucydides.51 His treatment of the story tacitly corrects the 
popular myth believed on the basis of artifacts and civil customs, but it explicitly 
corrects the historicized account prevalent among his own cultivated elite 
audience. The corruptions introduced by hearsay into the Athenian historicized 
account are misidentification of the slain man as the tyrant (1.20.2, 6.54.2), 
misunderstanding of the character of the tyranny (6.54.5-55.4), and, implicitly, 
misevaluation of Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s response (1.20.2, 6.56.3, 57.2-3). 
Thucydides provides the corrected historicized account, in which the slain man 
is the tyrant’s brother, the tyrant rules well until his brother is killed, and 
Harmodius and especially Aristogeiton act irrationally and against everyone’s 
best interests. The Athenian account’s corruptions are significant, as they 
                                                 
51 Thucydides leaves the story of the tyrannicides (along with all other individual historical 
figures) out of his history of early Athens (1.2-19), stating plainly that it was the Lacedaimonians 
who deposed Athens’ tyrants (1.18.1). When he introduces the story of the tyrannicides as an 
example of the Athenians’ casual historical errors at 1.20.1, it looks as though he is going to assert 
the failure of Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s deed to overthrow the tyranny (as Herodotus does at 
Hdt. 5.55). Instead, Thucydides grants the Athenians the knowledge that the Lacedaimonians 
were the real tyrant-deposers (6.53.3). 
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harmonize a historicized account with the presupposition of the mythologized 
story. Tyrants compete with and intrude upon citizens’ desires; since Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton were defending themselves from tyrannical desire, therefore 
the man they killed had to be the tyrant. The Athenians’ apparent insistence 
upon retaining these elements of the democratic foundation myth reveals their 
investment in the identity it provides. 
The Athenian account described by Thucydides (both at 1.20 and in book 
6) acknowledges that the Lacedaimonians were responsible for the expulsion of 
the tyrants, though this is the element of the story left out in popular expressions 
like the song of the tyrannicides. The Athenians are as well aware of this fact as 
they are of the tyranny’s harshness (6.53.3): 
ἐπιστάμενος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἀκοῇ τὴν Πεισιστράτου καὶ τῶν παίδων 
τυραννίδα χαλεπὴν τελευτῶσαν γενομένην καὶ προσέτι οὐδ’ ὑφ’ 
ἑαυτῶν καὶ Ἁρμοδίου καταλυθεῖσαν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, 
ἐφοβεῖτο αἰεὶ καὶ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἐλάμβανεν.  
 
The chief difference between the Athenians’ and Thucydides’ account with 
regard to these details (and the chief corruption introduced by hearsay) appears 
to lie in the Athenians’ assumptions about the character of the tyranny. 
Thucydides, following Herodotus,52 asserts that the tyrants ruled well until 
Hipparchus was killed, and the harshness of the last years of Hippias’ rule was a 
                                                 
52 Herodotus 5.55; discussed at Stanton 1990: 121. 
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reaction to that event.53 Thucydides claims that the Athenians’ inaccurate beliefs 
about the tyrannicide led to the paranoia with which they prosecuted suspects in 
the case of the Herm mutilations and the profanation of the Mysteries (6.60.1). 
This inference of the Athenians suggests that they retained an assumption that 
the Peisistratid tyranny was unbearable even prior to Hipparchus’ death, and 
that Harmodius and Aristogeiton were responding to this harshness of the 
tyranny. In Stahl’s words, “the Athenians have interpreted the causality 
erroneously,”54 by interpreting the harshness of the Peisistratid tyranny as a 
cause of Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s act, rather than a result. By reversing the 
causality, the Athenians resist the notion that the tyranny may have been 
basically good. 
This assumption leads to the Athenian’s second error: the 
misidentification of the tyrant (1.20.2, 6.54.2). If Hipparchus was the one who 
offended the heroes, their reasoning seems to go, Hipparchus must have been the 
tyrant, because the foundation myth had figured tyrants as the ones whose 
overarching desires trespass the possessions of the citizen.55 There is also another 
                                                 
53 Connor 1984: 177, n. 47,“Although Thucydides’ account corrects Herodotus in some respects 
[…] it emphasizes that it was the revised or more accurate version of the Peisistratid story that in 
415 led to the exaggerated fear of renewed tyranny.” 
54 Stahl 2003 (1966): 8. 
55 Wohl 2002: 217-218. 
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argument behind the identification of Hipparchus as the tyrant, which rests on 
the Athenians’ investment in the foundation myth’s coincidence of public and 
private good. If Hipparchus was primary target of the heroes, Hipparchus must 
have been the tyrant; otherwise, Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s act does not 
resound to the public benefit, and the Athenians would have to reconsider to 
what extent their own desires coincide with those of the city. The beginning of 
the Sicilian expedition, however, is not a time at which the Athenians are open to 
reexamining their private desires.56  
Thucydides knows how important it is to the Athenians that their 
tyrannicides have slain a tyrant. Determined to convince this audience, he goes 
so far as to cite his evidence (inscriptions, 6.54.7-55.2) and explicitly repeat his 
argument (6.55.3), both interruptions absent from typical Thucydidean 
narrative.57 Meyer 2008 interprets Thucydides’ appeal to evidence as providing 
an example of the approach to history that he advocated in the proem to book 1: 
he does not take hearsay at face value, but compares it to better (especially 
visible) sources of information, such as historical inscriptions.58 The oddity is that 
the inscriptions are not conclusive; Aristotle moderates Thucydides’ view, 
                                                 
56 Wohl 2002: 193-195. The ἔρως, πόθος, and ἐπιθυμία fueling the Sicilian expedition are 
described by Thucydides at 6.24.3-4. 
57 Woodman 1988: 16. 
58 Meyer 2008: 29, 31. 
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concluding that Hippias was in charge, but that both brothers shared the rule.59 
Thucydides’ adamancy appears to be partly rhetorical: thinking that Hipparchus 
was a co-regnant may not be sheer folly, but thinking that Hipparchus is tyrant 
simply because he was killed is so foolish that it must be countered in every way 
possible. On the other hand, the corrected version of the H&A story contains 
more detail than Thucydides’ method can support, and many details seem 
difficult to explain except as attempts to incorporate elements of the Athenian 
account. For example, Aristogeiton and Harmodius are each doubly motivated, 
and no explanation is given why Aristogeiton should plot against Hippias and 
the tyranny simply because he is angry with Hipparchus. The impression is that 
Thucydides is granting his audience everything he considers it possible to grant 
– and then making the story still appear absurd. 
To evaluate the difference between the Athenians’ and Thucydides’ 
account of Harmodius’ and Aristogeiton’ motives, it is necessary to look more 
closely at Thucydides’ narrative of the supposed tyrannicide. The handsome 
young Harmodius is in a relationship with the older and less noble Aristogeiton 
when Hipparchus (the younger brother of the tyrant Hippias) propositions him. 
When Harmodius relates the fact of this unwelcome advance to Aristogeiton, the 
latter responds with grief and fear: ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικῶς περιαλγήσας καὶ φοβηθεὶς 
                                                 
59 Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 17.3.18.1. 
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τὴν Ἱππάρχου δύναμιν μὴ βίᾳ προσαγάγηται αὐτόν, ἐπιβουλεύει εὐθὺς ὡς 
ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀξιώσεως κατάλυσιν τῇ τυραννίδι (6.54.3). There is no 
indication why Aristogeiton targets Hippias as well as Hipparchus; the 
overthrow of the tyranny seems to be a means to the end of decreasing 
Hipparchus’ personal power. At the same time, there is an impression that 
Aristogeiton, like the later Athenians, is conflating the two brothers.  
There is likewise no stated explanation for Aristogeiton’s fear. Meyer 2008 
shows that Thucydides’ language consistently suggests that Aristogeiton and 
even Hipparchus are reacting out of proportion.60 Thucydides goes on to 
characterize the Peisistratid reign as, for the most part, good and intelligent 
(ἀρετὴν καὶ ξύνεσιν, 6.54.5), and neither financially nor otherwise oppressive 
(ἐπαχθὴς, 6.54.5). Aristogeiton, however, is anachronistically characterized as 
possessed of the same assumptions as those that corrupt the Athenians’ account 
of the story.61 Aristogeiton cannot believe that if Hipparchus wants something 
that does not belong to him, he will not abuse his power to take it. Thucydides, 
on the other hand, specifically tells us that Hipparchus does not want to do 
anything forceful: βίαιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐβούλετο (6.54.4). Instead, he and Hippias 
                                                 
60 Meyer 2008: 13-19 especially points out καταγορεύει (6.54.3), δι' ὀργῆς...ἐρωτικῆς (6.57.3), 
παροξύνω (6.56.1-2), ἀπεροσκέπτως (6.57.3), and ἀλόγιστος τόλμα (6.54.1; 6.59.1). 
61 Wohl 2002: 266. 
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insult Harmodius’ family by a slight whose severity is debated.62 Even this event 
occurs after Aristogeiton has already instigated the conspiratorial plan to 
overthrow the tyranny, so that it adds little but passion to the cause (6.56.2).  
Aristogeiton misunderstands the nature of the Peisistratid tyranny, and 
this is the reason he responds the way he does. Thucydides makes this point 
clearer in his narrative of the murder itself. When Aristogeiton and Harmodius 
witness one of the conspirators chatting with Hippias, they believe they have 
been betrayed, and panic. Thucydides’ explanation of the witnessed conversation 
has a different tone (6.57.2): ἦν δὲ πᾶσιν εὐπρόσοδος ὁ Ἱππίας, Hippias was 
approachable to everyone. Aristogeiton and Harmodius seem to assume that the 
tyrant would not be conversing with someone outside of his circle without a 
good reason, but Thucydides again contradicts their assumption. Having 
conceived of this conspiracy on the basis of a misunderstanding about 
Hipparchus’ designs on Harmodius, they now abandon it when they (very 
probably) misunderstand Hippias’ conversation with their associate. Instead, 
                                                 
62 Lavelle 1986: 320 argues that when Hipparchus and Hippias dangled the honor of basket-
bearing before Harmodius’ sister, only to snatch it away again, they insinuated not that her 
family was too insignificant (her family’s rank had not changed), but that she was not of good 
moral character; i.e., that her virginity was doubted. He further argues that this necessitated the 
degree of Harmodius’ response (Lavelle 1986: 325), although admitting that the author of the 
later dialogue Hipparchus finds this insult to the sister an insufficient motivation for the deed 
(Lavelle 1986: 330). Meyer 2008: 17 summarizes the insult’s effects more moderately: “Harmodius 
is humiliated but neither directly harmed nor taken by force; Hipparchus' own sense of shame is 
relieved, his δύναμις demonstrated.” 
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they decide impulsively that they should at least have revenge upon Hipparchus, 
who was, after all, the cause of their immediate peril (6.57.3). So it is that 
Thucydides can say, τὸ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ Ἁρμοδίου τόλμημα δι' 
ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν ἐπεχειρήθη (54.1): their first motivation (to have 
vengeance on Hipparchus) becomes their last, when they have given up on the 
political conspiracy. 
Thucydides describes the state of mind in which they attack and kill 
Hipparchus: they act at once, irrationally (εὐθὺς ἀπερισκέπτως), Aristogeiton 
moved by erotic rage (δι’ ὀργῆς ὁ μὲν ἐρωτικῆς), Harmodius moved by how 
violently he has been insulted (ὁ δὲ ὑβρισμένος). Falling upon (περιέτυχον) 
Hipparchus, they strike at him until he is dead (ἔτυπτον καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν 
αὐτόν). This image of the tyrannicides’ deed should be contrasted with the 
portrayal of the tyrannicides most familiar to Thucydides and the Athenians, the 
statue group in the agora: “The figures ‘stride forward boldly.’ Every gesture 
suggests self-possession. The facial expressions connote nobility and 
dedication.”63 The image “engages the viewer in imagining the strength that 
comes from uniting youthful vigor and boldness with mature, considerate 
                                                 
63 Monoson 2000: 31, citing Castriota, “Democracy and Art in Late Sixth- and Fifth-Century 
B.C.Athens” in I. Morris and K. A. Raaflaub (eds.) Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges. 
Dubuque, Iowa: 203. 
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deliberation.”64 Thucydides deliberately divests the scene of its iconographical 
associations with virtue and nobility. Even the unity with which the statue 
figures proceed65 is only outwardly mirrored by Thucydides’ description; the 
lovers’ internal motivations are only contingently related, now that the common 
purpose of overthrowing the tyranny has been abandoned. 
As for the conspiracy, as a security measure it was small, but Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton had hoped that the many men armed for the festival would join 
them when they witnessed the attempt. Thucydides, however, informs us that 
few men did (6.66.3): 
ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ προειδότας, εἰ καὶ ὁποσοιοῦν τολμήσειαν, ἐκ 
τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἔχοντάς γε ὅπλα ἐθελήσειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς 
ξυνελευθεροῦν. 
 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton thought that the overthrow of the tyranny would 
be widely supported by their fellow Athenians, but again, they were mistaken. It 
is the Athenians of 415 who feel themselves innately opposed to tyrants, not the 
contemporaries of the tyrannicides. Two of Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s 
mistakes arise from an ideologically democratic perspective on the nature of 
tyranny: they misunderstand Hipparchus’ intentions and misinterpret the 
                                                 
64 Monoson 2000: 31. 
65 Monoson 2000: 31: “their postures are similar, and the composition employs a large number of 
parallel axes, giving the impression that their movements are choreographed: they are depicted 
acting in concert, as a unity.” 
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conversation between Hippias and their associate. Their third mistake, 
misunderstanding the desires of their fellow Athenians, arises from an 
anachronistic perspective on the character of Athenians as tyrant-haters. 
Thucydides makes Harmodius and Aristogeiton share the assumptions of the 
Athenians who misremember their story.66 He grants to the heroes the ideology 
that legend had derived from them, but in his account, that ideology functions 
only as blindness. The Peisistratid tyrants are, on the whole, neither arrogant nor 
unjust; apart from their own paranoia, Harmodius and Aristogeiton have 
suffered nothing that could not have occurred within a democracy. It is only 
when their rash deed engenders reciprocal paranoia on the part of Hippias that 
the tyranny takes on the violent and unjust characteristics they had presumed of 
it. 
The one difference in the Athenian and the Thucydidean characterization 
of the tyrannicides is the difference necessitated by identifying Hipparchus as the 
tyrant’s younger brotHdt. Even though Thucydides allows that Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton planned to kill Hippias (and this intention is quite undermotivated 
apart from the noted anachronism), they panic and resort to an impulsive back-
up plan that results in their targeting Hipparchus alone. As Harmodius and 
                                                 
66 This is true, at least, of Aristogeiton. Harmodius’ perspective is less clear from Thucydides’ 
account. 
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Aristogeiton abandon the political conspiracy in favor of personal vengeance, 
Thucydides “[tears] apart the pleasant illusion of an easy congruence of public 
and private goods.”67 The violent and impassioned way in which they carry out 
the crime strengthens the association between their paranoid and extreme act of 
vengeance and the subsequent paranoid and vengeful character of Hippias’ 
tyranny. 
Whereas the popular and traditional version of the tyrannicide myth 
celebrated the ability of the Athenian people, represented by heroes such as 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton, to overthrow tyrannical rule, the historicized 
version of the myth has undercut Athenian confidence in their ability to maintain 
and restore democracy. The hearsay account on which they rely has not, 
however, preserved the fact that the democracy did not really need restoring at 
the time of the supposed tyrannicide. Continuing to assume that Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton did the right thing in attempting to overthrow a tyrant, they are 
now frightened by the knowledge that the tyranny was not successfully 
overthrown. They respond by anxiously trying harder to prevent a tyrant from 
appearing again.68 The Athenians thus prosecute the mutilators of the Herms and 
                                                 
67 Monoson 2000: 43. 
68 Orwin 1994: 125-126. 
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the profaners of the Mysteries in an attempt to succeed where Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton failed. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter IV. Myth, Hearsay History, and the Affair of the Herms and the 
Mysteries 
 
Thucydides’ account of the prosecutions mirrors the Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton story, as paranoia again leads to misunderstandings and mistakes. 
In the Athenians’ case, however, Thucydides reveals a level of self-awareness 
that is absent from his characterization of the tyrannicides (Aristogeiton is 
sufficiently caricatured that he never seems to consider the possibility that he 
may be mistaken). While the Athenians’ misunderstanding of the Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton story accounts for their increased fear of tyrants, the careless 
attitude towards history that occasioned this misunderstanding is paralleled by 
their careless attitude towards truth during the prosecutions. 
Thucydides’ sole interest in the Herms and the Mysteries is the Athenian 
response. He emphasizes that the timing of the Herm mutilation contributed to 
its perceived significance, because it seemed to be an omen against the 
expedition, and the action of a conspiracy against the democracy (6.27.1, 6.27.3).69 
                                                 
69 Wohl 2002: 205, “If Athens’ imperial eros is, as Nicias implies, a sickness, the mutilation of the 
Herms is its most urgent symptom.” Wohl reads the Herms as symbols of “masculine hardness, 
the autonomy and freedom of a civic soma autarkes, presence and being” (Wohl 2002: 206), and 
interprets their castration as a symbol of “the futility of that longing” (Wohl 2002: 207), and thus a 
bad omen for the expedition. While we know of the “castration” of the Herms from other sources, 
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The affair of the Mysteries comes up only when the Athenians vote to solicit 
information to see whether any other impieties (ἀσέβημα) have been committed 
(6.27.2). This roundabout manner of investigating the matter of the Herms is met 
with an equally roundabout response: no one knows anything about the Herms, 
but metics and attendants report that drunken young men have vandalized some 
other statues, and the Mysteries are being privately mocked (ἐν οἰκίαις ἐφ’ 
ὕβρει, 6.28.1) by Alcibiades. 70 Thucydides makes no connection between these 
incidents and gives no reason to believe there was one, but the ill-defined 
investigation latches onto this new report. 
It is at this point, after showing the fearful and suspicious approach the 
Athenians are already taking towards addressing this crisis, that Thucydides 
                                                                                                                                                 
Thucydides does not tell us this detail. If we read the mutilation of the Herms the way the 
Athenians did – a deed related in kind to the profanation of the Mysteries and Alcibiades’ anti-
democratic profligacy – the incident seems more reflective of the Sicilian expedition than 
opposed to it, insofar as Athenian imperialism has been characterized as impious (see Forde 1986: 
444, Ahrensdorf 1997: 260 on the Melian debates) and motivated by eros not dissimilar to 
Alcibiades’. 
70 Monoson 2000: 44.45 discusses Thucydides’ interest in the role of class within the Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton story (signaled by his specification at 6.54.2 that Aristogeiton was not from a 
distinguished family). There, the ruling family slights the prominent and thus fragile family of 
Harmodius’ and offends his sensitive middle-class lover, Aristogeiton, and is assassinated in 
recompense. Class plays a related role in the framing story: citizens, foreigners, and slaves are all 
invited to testify against suspected perpetrators of sacrilege, without fear of recrimination 
(6.27.2). The testimony received from metics and servants is that the Mysteries have been 
parodied in private by some of the most prominent men in the city: Alcibiades and his friends 
(6.28.1). Meyer 2008 writes that the Athenians “think their willingness to overlook class 
distinctions in informants constitutes ‘investigating the matter’” (Meyer 2008: 29). Thucydides, 
however, is presenting the willingness to overlook class distinctions as detracting from, rather 
than contributing, to the fairness of the investigation. 
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introduces Alcibiades’ opponents (6.28.2). These men resent Alcibiades as a 
political obstacle because they themselves have ambitions of being first within 
the city (τοῦ δήμου…προεστάναι, 6.28.2). Towards the removal of this obstacle, 
they make a big deal (ἐμεγάλυνον, 6.28.2) out of these accusations, connecting 
the Herms and the Mysteries on the grounds that both offenses signify the 
dissolution of the democracy (ἐπὶ δήμου καταλύσει, 6.28.2). Their evidence for 
Alcibiades’ involvement in an antidemocratic conspiracy is the undemocratic 
extravagance of his affairs (οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν, 6.28.2).71 As stated, this 
argument borrows its plausibility from the general Athenian opposition of 
unrestrained tyrannical eros to the self-controlled, publicly beneficent eros that 
characterizes a democratic citizen.72 Alcibiades’ trial, however, is delayed on 
account of Athens’ own imperial and thus tyrannical eros (or duseros, as Nicias 
would have it), the Sicilian expedition (6.29.1). 73 
 The prosecutions continue in Alcibiades’ absence. The passage that frames 
the Harmodius and Aristogeiton digression (6.53.2-3) echoes the vocabulary and 
concepts of 1.20.74 The Athenians continue not distinguishing between (οὐ 
                                                 
71 Wohl 2002: 141. 
72 Wohl 2002: 129-130. 
73 Thucydides 6.13.3, discussed at Wohl 2002: 171-172; see also Wohl 2002: 188-196. 
74 Meyer 2008: 26-30. 
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δοκιμάζοντες) informants, but take (ἀποδεχόμενοι) everything suspiciously 
when it comes to the accused. They are willing to arrest good men lest bad men 
escape, so that they might examine the matter and find out what they want to 
know (βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν, 6.53.2). The same words that 
Thucydides uses of examining hearsay and discovering knowledge 
(ἀβασανίστως, 1.21.1; ηὑρίσκετο 1.22.3) are used here of examining the matter 
of the Herms and finding the perpetrators. The informants whom Thucydides 
would be examining (by implication from his criticism of those who examine 
sources ἀβασανίστως, 1.21.1 – literally, “without torture”), the Athenians do not 
even evaluate (δοκιμάζοντες, 6.53.2). Just as with the hearsay of history, the 
Athenians take what they are told (δέχονται, 1.21.1; ἀποδεχόμενοι, 6.53.2), and 
here it is specified that it is a state of mind that moves them to do so (ὑπόπτως, 
6.53.2). It is this state of affairs that Thucydides attributes to their 
misunderstanding of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story; on another level, it 
is their casual and pleasure-oriented approach to the Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton story which leads them to approach other events (τὰ γενόμενα), 
such as the mutilation of the Herms, in such an irrational and self-deceptive way. 
The self-deception involved in the Athenians’ abuse of justice is most 
plainly seen in the resolution of the investigation. A prisoner is persuaded by a 
fellow prisoner to confess to mutilating the Herms, whether or not he actually 
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had done so.75 This way, he will benefit the city by halting the arrests, and benefit 
himself with the immunity granted to him for confessing (6.60.3). (Subsequent 
proceedings vindicate the prisoners’ doubt that innocence would protect him in a 
trial.) When this prisoner both confesses and informs against a list of other men, 
the Athenians receive this information gladly (ἄσμενος), thinking that they have 
arrived at τὸ σαφές, a clear understanding of the actual facts (6.60.4). They free 
the informant and every suspect that he has not accused; they condemn to death 
every man who appears on the informant’s list (6.60.4). Thucydides has already 
told us, however, that no one, either then or afterward, had clear knowledge (τὸ 
σαφές) of the deed (6.60.2). His conclusion makes clear that the confession has 
been received in the same spirit in which it was given: κἀν τούτῳ οἱ μὲν 
παθόντες ἄδηλον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρηντο, ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις ἐν τῷ 
παρόντι περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο (6.60.5), even if these men were punished 
unjustly, it was plain that the city was benefited for the moment. 
The concepts and vocabulary in this passage again recall the language of 
book one’s proem: the Athenians believe they have obtained from their dubious 
informant the same τὸ σαφές which Thucydides hopes his own composition will 
reveal to the right kind of reader (1.21.4). While the informant’s list of names 
                                                 
75 Thucydides specifies that it was not the confessor’s own idea, muddling the information’s 
origins with yet another degree of separation. 
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successfully ended the witch-hunt and benefited Athens at the time (ἐν τῷ 
παρόντι, 6.60.5), Thucydides’ work is not intended for a momentary reception 
(ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν, 1.21.4). The Athenians would rather pretend to have 
a clear understanding (τὸ σαφές) than examine their informants and discover a 
truth that may leave them with no scapegoat for their anxieties about the 
expedition and their imperialistic desires. 
The Athenians quickly suppressed their awareness of how irresponsibly 
they trusted the testimony of one man to such an extent that no one he accused 
was pardoned. Thucydides tells us that it was because the Athenians believed 
themselves to possess a clear understanding of the Herms (ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν 
Ἑρμῶν ᾤοντο σαφὲς ἔχειν, 6.61.1) that they were finally convinced that 
Alcibiades had profaned the Mysteries as a conspiratorial act against the 
democracy (6.61). The logic is difficult to follow. On one level, the Athenians are 
confident as a result of the Herms trials. Having found some, they feel that it is 
possible (contrary to their previous fears, 6.60.4) to discover the rest of the 
oligarchic and tyrannical conspirators. The historicized account of the 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton story shattered the Athenians’ confidence in 
themselves as tyrannicides, but by resurrecting their carelessness towards facts, 
they create a new falsehood to restore their confidence again. A substantial 
connection may also be implied: because the mutilation of the Herms was an 
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anti-democratic act after all, the profanation of the Mysteries looks more political 
as well. 
Finally, having already employed questionable testimony as sufficient to 
determine guilt, the Athenians are ready to condemn Alcibiades on equally 
questionable grounds. In this way, the procedure they had followed for the 
public benefit in the matter of the Herms (arbitrarily trusting questionable 
evidence to reach illusory certainty), is sidetracked to serve a private cause (the 
private interests of Alcibiades’ enemies). This deflection is comparable to the 
chance whereby Harmodius and Aristogeiton end up abandoning the political 
coup to avenge the original personal grievance: the Athenians are trying to 
compensate for the frightening ending of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story 
by acting out the mythologized version, but they are actually reenacting 
Thucydides’ historical account. The Athenians had once based their confidence 
on a tyrannicide myth; now they need to restore their confidence by making a 
show of succeeding where Harmodius and Aristogeiton had failed. But just as 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton not only failed to end the tyranny but actually 
contributed to its harshness, the Athenians are unwittingly playing into the 
hands of men who desire oligarchic preeminence over the people (6.28.2), even 
as they suppose themselves to be weeding out would-be oligarchics and tyrants.  
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One final misunderstanding contributes to the Athenians’ decision to 
bring Alcibiades to trial. A small Lacedaimonian force approaches the isthmus, 
having something to do with the Boiotians (6.61.2). This is interpreted as 
evidence that Alcibiades had made arrangements with the Lacedaimonians, with 
the implication that, having once deposed an Athenian tyrant, the 
Lacedaimonians were now going to instate one (6.61.2). The recent arrests are 
credited with the salvation of the city (6.61.2). Thucydides makes these 
conclusions appear absurd, and attributes them to the machinations of 
Alcibiades’ enemies, but the Athenians act on them. The arrests and executions 
which, though they may not have been just, plainly served the best interests of 
the city for the time (τῷ παρόντι περιφανῶς, 6.60.5) lead to a decision that is not 
in Athens’ best interest at all: the loss and alienation of the commander whose 
leadership was needed for the Sicilian expedition (6.15.3-5).76 Once again, the 
Athenians bring about the thing that they fear in their attempts to evade it: in 
attempting to quell plots against the democracy, they fall into the hands of 
would-be oligarchs, and while their belief that Alcibiades conspired with the 
Spartans is false, once driven from Athens he conspires with the Spartans. 
Athens is ultimately harmed by the self-deception involved in the Herms trial. If 
the Harmodius and Aristogeiton digression “comment[s] on the dangers 
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inherent in historical knowledge,”77 the knowledge involved is qualified by the 
degree to which the Athenians resist details of the historicized account that 
contradict democratic ideology. The real danger is in the Athenians thinking they 
have historical knowledge that they actually lack. 
Likewise, the story of the persecutions that frames the digression 
illustrates the dangers inherent in all knowledge that is pretended, 
unsubstantiated, and false, but still received as τὸ σαφές. Thucydides invited the 
ideal reader of 1.22.4 to employ his composition in comparing past with future 
events, on the reasoning that things of the same sort or similar will happen again, 
according to human nature (κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, 1.22.4). The entire affair of the 
Herms and Mysteries serves as a cautionary tale not simply for fact-checking, but 
for an approach to history that filters the past through political or ideological 
screens, and subsequently blurs the clarity (τὸ σαφές) of what really happened. 
The trouble in the affair of the Herms and the Mysteries is that the 
Athenians, having heard but not understood the historical account of the 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton story, could no longer base their confidence on a 
tyrannicide myth, but needed to restore their confidence by making a show of 
succeeding where Harmodius and Aristogeiton had failed. Elsewhere in 
Thucydides, mythical versions of history remain unchallenged and continue to 
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function normally as foundations of political identity. After the Spartan general 
Brasidas has successfully protected Amphipolis from the Athenians, the 
Amphipolitans violently erase their own history in order to recreate their city as 
founded by Brasidas (5.11).78 They do this not only to honor Brasidas (for whom 
they have initiated a hero cult), but also to align their patriotic legends with their 
foreign alliances. 
The point of the myth is clearly not that it be true or false, but that it 
express and reinforce what the Amphipolitans want to say about themselves. 
The Athenians are clearly thinking differently from the Amphipolitans when 
they respond with fear to the historicized version of the Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton story. The Amphipolitans know that they were really founded by 
Hagnon, not Brasidas; that is why they want to create a myth. Recalling Flory’s 
observation that the phrase ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα at 1.21.1 implies that 
stories compete to win the status of myth,79 we see that the fabricated legend that 
Amphipolis was founded by Brasidas is “conquering” the story of Hagnon, 
because the Brasidas story serves the needs of the moment. 
The Athenians, by contrast, have come to expect that their myths should 
be true. In year 415, they are distraught about the historical fact that Harmodius 
                                                 
78 McGlew 1993: 153-154. 
79 Flory 1990: 200, and see discussion above. 
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and Aristogeiton failed to overthrow the tyranny, and they are in danger of 
losing the confidence and sense of identity that the myth had provided. If they 
were treating history as history, and myth as myth, they would not allow the 
historical fact to interfere with the significance of the myth, just as the 
Amphipolitans adopt the Brasidas myth because of its significance, not its 
historical veracity. 
  
 
 
Chapter V. Supplanting Myth and History: Pericles 
 
 
A second look at Pericles’ funeral oration helps account for the Athenians’ 
confusion of foundation myth and historical record. Again, the parallels between 
Pericles and Thucydides both conceal and illuminate the difference between the 
two. Pericles asserts that Athens needs no Homer, the meaning of whose praise is 
harmed by the truth of deeds (τῶν δ’ ἔργων τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει, 
2.41.4). They have no need of exaggerations; they are served just as well by the 
way things are. Thucydides likewise criticized the exaggerations of poetry, and 
argued that the facts themselves prove the greatness of the Peloponnesian War, 
not any rhetoric of his own. Although funeral orations were typically an occasion 
for the recitation of patriotic legends and foundation myths relevant to war, 
Pericles deliberately passes these over, and calls attention to the omission 
(2.36.4): ὧν ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἕκαστα ἐκτήθη […] 
μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω.80 Thucydides similarly excised 
the mythical and patriotic elements from traditional history in his Archeology.  
                                                 
80 Thomas 1989: 197-200; Loraux 2000: 92. 
56 
It has already been shown, however, how Pericles revives the mythical 
and patriotic elements in a new, abstract form. For example, if Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton’s mutual devotion is exemplary for Athens’ citizens, Pericles 
outdoes the traditional myth by making democratic citizens lovers of the city 
itself. Even when he is promoting roughly the same ideology as the myth, the 
effect of Pericles’ abstractions is to remove all lingering sense of historic 
contingency. Pericles’ lack of interest in contingency is explicit at 1.140.1, where 
he provides a significantly counterintuitive argument against abandoning 
rational calculation in the face of τὰς ξυμφορὰς (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς 
τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου, 1.140.1).81 Just because contingent chance can thwart your plans, 
does not mean that your plans were bad ones – indeed, this is why, when things 
go wrong, we (correctly) blame chance (δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ 
λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι, 1.140.1). Pericles overstates his argument 
that the Athenians should not be dissuaded from the original strategy, and the 
result is a disconnect between rational plan (Pericles uses the words γνώμης, 
ξυμβουλευτέα, τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, τὰς διανοίας) and contingent event. 
Pericles’ rhetorical preference for the abstract pervades his oration. When 
speaking of the history of Athens, he summarizes each generation’s 
                                                 
81 Flory 1988: 49, 55 cited in Morrison 2006: 6. 
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achievements in terms of their contributions first to the city, and then to the 
empire (2.36). After declining to recount the Athenians’ legendary achievements, 
Pericles does not turn with Thucydides to more recent, better substantiated 
history, but instead he turns to questions which could be addressed through 
history, but which Pericles will address only from the point of view of the 
present: ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ᾽ οἵας 
πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο (2.36.4). Pericles, in his apparent 
regard for accuracy, may come closer to Thucydides than do Athenian patriotic 
myths, but the myths come closer to Thucydides in their at least partial regard 
for history. 
The same transformation of Athens’ mythical identity from the legendary 
to the abstracted can be seen in Pericles’ eulogy of the Athenian dead at 2.43. 
Pericles will not stop at speaking of the real, historical inscription that was raised 
for these casualties, but insists on speaking of an unwritten memory dwelling not 
in some monument, but in the minds of their survivors (ἄγραφος μνήμη παρ’ 
ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδιαιτᾶται, 2.43.3). Pericles’ 
assertion that the entire world is the tomb of illustrious men (2.43.3) alludes to 
Marathon, where, contrary to custom, the casualties were interred on the 
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battlefield.82 But instead of explicitly recalling the already legendary battle and 
allowing its glory to subsume these men’s, Pericles holds forth these men as a 
model for emulation (2.43.4): οὓς νῦν ὑμεῖς ζηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ εὔδαιμον τὸ 
ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ’ ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὔψυχον κρίναντες μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς 
πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους. The incomparable greatness of the Peloponnesian War 
notwithstanding, the story of these men’s death is in no way legendary; Pericles 
refocuses his audience on their abstract virtues and ideals instead. Again, 
Pericles’ approach appears comparable to Thucydides’, insofar as Thucydides’ 
composition explores motivation, reason, and rationale,83 and the things that 
happen κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. But the funeral oration’s omission of any 
historical event or any individual historical person indicates that Pericles is not 
interested in the things that happen (τὰ γενόμενα), but only in the abstract 
ideals themselves.84 
Pericles’ model describes the Athenians’ relationship to knowledge. They 
are free from suspicion of one another and from fear of foreigners (2.37). They 
are capable of responding courageously to dangers without being compelled by 
                                                 
82 Herodotus 9.85.2. The cult of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was associated with the heroes of 
Marathon and the casualties of the Persian War in general (Loraux 2000: 73).  
83 Hunter 1971: 19. 
84 Loraux 2000: 51 observes that Thucydides never acknowledges the lists of the names of the 
dead that formed an important part of the remembrance of war casualties in Athens. 
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harsh training (2.39). Similarly, they love wisdom without softness (2.40.1), and 
calculation only contributes to their daring (2.40.3). Pericles builds up an image 
of Athenians as men who face life with their eyes open: of all men, in the most 
varied circumstances, Athenians are able to rely on themselves (6.41.1). It seems 
consistent then, that Pericles should not speak to please, as Thucydides tells us 
(2.65.8); his Athenian audience should be able to respond correctly to facts. But 
when Thucydides elaborates, the picture changes (2.65.9):  
 
oπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, 
λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβείσθαι, και δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως 
ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. 
 
Pericles does not speak openly to the Athenians; instead, he compensates for 
their irrational responses. The Athenians do not live up to the model described in 
the funeral oration. Pericles knows this, as the first words of his plague speech 
indicate (2.60.1): 
 
καὶ προσδεχομένῳ μοι τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑμῶν ἔς με γεγένηται 
(αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας) καὶ ἐκκλησίαν τούτου ἕνεκα ξυνήγαγον 
 
Pericles knew the Athenians would be angry, and perceived the cause. The 
purpose of the speech underway is to address and alter their reaction.85 Pericles’ 
                                                 
85 Cf. also 1.140.1, where Pericles accuses the Athenians of inconstancy. 
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speeches are designed to meet the needs of the moment. He can predict the 
Athenians’ responses insofar as they are instinctual and unconsidered. 
Pericles appeals to the Athenians’ abstract reason, but he does not rely on 
them to act rationally as a result. His words plant in the Athenians a desire to be 
knowledgeable and rational, but the shepherding function of his speeches 
reinforces their habitual illogical responses. They do not need to be 
knowledgeable and rational so long as he is personally checking their mistakes, 
as Thucydides describes him doing at 2.65.9. In historical terms, Pericles makes 
the Athenians want to rely on themselves and their own present and future 
actions rather than looking back to their civic heroes, but fails to supplant their 
habit of deriving confidence and a sense of political identity from stories. 
Thucydides’ conclusion is that this spokesman of democracy was actually the 
rule of the first man (2.65.9). In this way, Pericles himself represents a deceptive 
mix of the aristocratic and democratic.  
The effects of these Periclean ideals can be observed in the affair of the 
Herms and the Mysteries. The Athenians treat the founding myth of Athenian 
democracy, the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as something between 
myth and history when they spread their frightening hearsay account. They 
respond with actions that are similarly situated between pretense and actuality: 
they pretend an act of tyrant-prevention so that they will have a historical basis 
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for the ideals that the Harmodius and Aristogeiton myth once provided. In terms 
of Csapo and Miller’s thesis distinguishing aristocratic and democratic accounts 
of time, the Athenians act aristocratically (and, as it happens, in the interests of 
would-be oligarchs) in emulating Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the affair of the 
Herms and Mysteries, even while they are prosecuting the enemies of the 
democracy.  
 
  
 
 
Chapter VI. Resisting Myth: Thucydides 
 
 
  Thucydides is interested in an accurate knowledge of contingent events. 
The Athenians attempt to treat history like myth when they receive the 
historicized hearsay account of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story in accord 
with the ideological assumptions that the Harmodius and Aristogeiton myth had 
always reinforced. Thucydides corrects the hearsay version of the story, and tries 
rhetorically to prevent its reformulation by presenting his evidence (6.54.7-55.2). 
Varying versions of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton myth are already prevalent, 
so Thucydides does not risk engendering an alternate account by revealing his 
evidence to his readership and thereby allowing them access to his critical 
process. 
 Elsewhere, however, Thucydides does not typically show his cards. His 
style is designed to convey a sense of certitude about the factual verity of the 
claims made, and no information is provided which might easily suggest 
alternate accounts. In the words of Kosso’s analysis: “Virtually all internal 
features of the text that are epistemologically significant are eliminative, that is, 
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useful in helping us decide what not to believe.”86 Wallace 1964 summarizes the 
effect of Thucydides’ rhetoric as a whole: 
“Mme de Romilly, and Professor Bodin, with whom she worked, have 
analysed the inevitability of Thucydides' narrative, the impossibility of 
interpreting the war in any other way than his, and have shown that ‘one 
is with him closer to rhetoric than to logic,’ that in a sense persuasion here 
takes precedence of truth.”87 
 
Wallace concludes that Thucydides is more of a political scientist than a 
historian.88 Woodman 1988 concludes more drastically that Thucydides’ style is 
an effect of sophistic priorities: he is more interested in communicating language 
than actual events.89 
These readings, however, conflate Thucydides with Pericles, and give the 
former little credit for his interest in an accurate record of contingent events. 
Thucydides is far from a sophist, if a sophist communicates languages rather 
than actual events. His authoritative rhetoric is not designed to stand between 
his reader and what happened, but functions to prevent readers from sourcing 
                                                 
86 Kosso 1993: 11-12. 
87 Wallace 1964: 260. 
88 Wallace 1964: 261. 
89 Woodman 1984: 14, 17, 25-26. 
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myths in Thucydides’ own accounts. 90 Dewald 1999 summarizes the impression 
given in the proem to book 1: 
“At the end of chapter 23 the stage is almost as bare of human beings and 
their voices as it was at the outset. Herodotus and some shadowy 
Athenians have been briefly conjured up as potential additional and 
alternative narrators but have then been allowed to vanish; the only voice 
remaining is Thucydides’ own.”91 
 
Thucydides’ critique of Herodotus in the proem appeared to hone in on his 
ambiguity. Thucydides’ narrative voice shuns factual ambiguity and leaves as 
little room as possible for misreading, especially of the tendentiously 
mythologizing sort. Thucydides’ univocal narrative voice gives him maximal 
control over the shape his history takes, but also nearly excludes partisan 
appropriation of his history’s events. 
                                                 
90 One of the most radical features of Thucydides’ composition is the explicitly methodological 
character of the proem itself. This revelation of method balances the methodological opacity of 
Thucydides’ main narrative. 
91 Dewald 1999: 240. 
  
 
 
Chapter VII. Conclusions 
 
The projected reader of the proem, like a certain sort of fifth-century 
Athenian, is pleased by the absence of τὸ μυθῶδες from Thucydides’ 
composition, because flattering, patriotic stories are obvious, vulgar, useless, and 
wrong, and the very antithesis of the subtle, sophisticated, self-interested, and 
informed qualities he is pleased to possess. Cleon’s accusatory assessment of his 
Athenian audience successfully illustrates that self-interest, intelligence, and 
sophistication need not imply an interest in things that actually happened. In 
Pericles’ funeral oration, vulgar foundation myth is replaced with intellectual, 
sophisticated foundation myth, and the result is that the sophisticated, self-
interested Athenians, inebriate on myths they are able to believe, no longer 
recognize τὸ μυθῶδες as obvious, vulgar, and false (let alone false, meaningful, 
and useful, an attitude the Amphipolitans exemplify). The disastrous Herms and 
Mysteries trials result from the Athenians’ new sophisticated naïvety, and serve 
as a lesson to the reader in the separation of history and political myth. 
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